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BOOK REVIEW 
 
GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
By Geertrui Van Overwalle, ed. 
 
Bruylant, 2007, 241 pp. ISBN 978-2-8027-2389-9 
 
Gene Patents and Public Health is a compilation of articles presented at a 2005 
symposium held at the University of Leuven, Belgium.1 At the outset, Professor 
Geertrui van Overwalle, the editor, sets the scene by acknowledging that patents in 
both the healthcare and genetic contexts have a troubled history, and by noting that 
the book (and the symposium which preceded it) probes questions about whether 
diagnostic gene patents hinder public health, and whether disease gene patents are 
inappropriate; if the turbulent history of gene patents is any indication, then we might 
expect that its future will be similarly clouded. Certainly the analyses offered in Gene 
Patents and Public Health suggests that this will be the case. 
Part 1 (contributions 1 to 4) considers whether gene patents for diagnostics are 
justified (i.e. whether diagnostic gene patents should exist).  In doing so, it adopts first 
a practical, then a philosophical, and finally a legal perspective, the aim being to 
analyse the question from a variety of disciplines so as to permit a richer conclusion. 
Part 2 (contributions 5 to 10) proceeds from the proposition that diagnostic gene 
patents are justified and can be granted, and therefore considers the exercise of patent 
rights in light thereof. Section 1 of Part 2 (contributions 5 to 7) focuses on contractual 
licensing in the medical sector, whereas Section 2 (contributions 8 to 10) focuses on 
compulsory licensing for public health, examining the French, Swiss and Belgian 
models. 
In “DNA Diagnostics in Practice”, without actually engaging with the justification v. 
exercise debate that forms the structure of the book, Matthijs, a molecular geneticist, 
explains that there are usually a variety of methods available for analysing any given 
mutation-based condition, and that a genetic diagnostic test is usually not the first 
mechanism for diagnosing a genetically-influenced clinical condition. With some 
600-900 currently known mutation-based conditions, this is an important and growing 
field in diagnostics.  However, he reports that attempts to realise commercial success 
in genetic testing results in “overly profit-oriented and restrictive behaviour”, and he 
cites the conduct of Myriad Genetics (re the BRCA breast cancer test) and Bio-Rad 
(re the hereditary haemochromatosis test). 
In “Ethics and Patents for Genetic Diagnostic Testing”, Baldwin, a philosopher, 
considers the social contract underlying the patent regime in the context of genetic 
diagnostics.  He notes that the contract is premised on both rights-based and utilitarian 
                                                
1 “Gene Patents and Public Health Symposium”, 27 May 2005, Centre for Intellectual Property Rights, 
University of Leuven, Belgium. 
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approaches simultaneously, but that the publicly-minded utilitarian view is 
particularly important in the healthcare context because health is a fundamental aspect 
of human welfare and healthcare delivery is a public responsibility. While 
acknowledging that diagnostic patents are eligible for patenting under the European 
Patent Convention (1973)2 because most tests are carried out on samples removed 
from the body, Baldwin laments that such patenting will likely obstruct other 
emerging technologies important to cost-effective delivery of healthcare, namely gene 
chips.  He appropriately challenges the practice of seeking a monopoly on the use of 
the gene (or sequence) when obtaining a monopoly on a particular diagnostic kit that 
has been developed from it, and he questions the conduct of inventors who use a 
patent on one diagnostic invention to block the invention and marketing of diagnostics 
for the same condition and relying on the same gene but operative in a different way. 
In “The EPC and the Granting Policy and Case Law of the EPO”, Thomas, an 
academic and member of the EPO, reviews some of the relatively little though still 
contradictory jurisprudence of the EPO’s Boards of Appeal.  Unfortunately, Thomas’s 
discussion has been rendered somewhat moot by the subsequent Opinion G0001/04, 
16 December 2005, in which the EPO’s Enlarged Board of Appeal concludes as 
follows:3 
• In order that the subject-matter of a claim relating to a diagnostic method 
practised on a human or animal body falls under the prohibition of Article 
52(4) EPC, the claim is to include the features relating to: (1) the diagnosis for 
curative purposes stricto sensu representing the deductive medical or 
veterinary decision phase as a purely intellectual exercise, (2) the preceding 
steps which are constitutive for making that diagnosis, and (3) the specific 
interactions with the human or animal body which occur when carrying those 
out among these preceding steps which are of a technical nature. 
• Whether or not a method is a diagnostic method within the meaning of Article 
52(4) EPC may neither depend on the participation of a medical or veterinary 
practitioner, nor on the fact that all method steps can also, or only, be practised 
by medical or technical support staff, the patient himself or herself or an 
automated system.  No distinction is to be made in this context between 
essential method steps having diagnostic character and non-essential method 
steps lacking it. 
• In a diagnostic method under Article 52(4) EPC, the method steps of a 
technical nature belonging to the preceding steps which are constitutive for 
making the diagnosis for curative purposes stricto sensu must satisfy the 
criterion “practised on the human or animal body”. 
• Article 52(4) EPC does not require a specific type and intensity of interaction 
with the human or animal body; a preceding step of a technical nature thus 
satisfies the criterion “practised on the human or animal body” if its 
performance implies any interaction with the human or animal body, 
necessitating the presence of the latter. 
 
                                                
2   See Article 52(4). 
3 See http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/g040001e.pdf [26 May 2008].  Note that van 
Overwalle references this Opinion at the end of that contribution. 
(2008) 5:3 SCRIPTed 
 
616 
In “Using the EPO Opposition Procedure as a Strategy Against Patents on Diagnostic 
Methods”, Bird, a European patent attorney, reiterates the value of such procedures in 
light of the relatively few patent infringement and nullity cases within the member 
states, and briefly compares the EPO context with that of the USA.  However, he 
concludes that, “although it is unlikely that any major changes of patent law will 
result directly from… oppositions, the general discussion seems to be changing 
informed opinion towards a harder line on the enforcement of patent law through the 
relevant legal institutions” (p. 82).4 
In “Licensing in the Medical Sector”, De Corte highlights the massive expense and 
risk associated with current pharmaceutical innovation models, and notes the 
consequent necessity of licensing compounds as a “Band-Aid” to filling the black 
holes in the existing big pharma drug pipeline.5  He goes on to suggest that the genetic 
breakthroughs and imaginings of the 1980s and ‘90s prompted a paradigm shift in 
patent and licensing practices.  Corporate conduct prompted by that shift has led some 
stakeholders to observe that patenting has become a research-stifling rather than a 
research-promoting tool. Now, he suggests, a second paradigm is underway, the 
consequences of which are not yet clear.  Unfortunately, whichever paradigm is in 
ascendance, the promise of our new scientific knowledge has not resulted in new 
understandings or medicines. Ultimately, it is not clear whether licensing in the new 
paradigm will have the desired effect of making effective treatments a reality. 
In “The Effect of Patents on Research and Development of Diagnostic Kits”, Vlassak 
and Schüller state that the patent system has served its innovation function well until 
recently, and that debate persists as to the need for patents in the diagnostics field (pp. 
101-102).  After briefly describing that field and the types of patents that are 
particularly relevant thereto, they examine the patent activities of Innogenetics, a 
medium-sized European biopharmaceutical company which has, they argue, used its 
diagnostics patent portfolio as a strategic asset to advance rather than stifle further 
R&D, doing so by out-licensing its own products on reasonable terms so it can in-
license other products so as to fill gaps in its own portfolio.  They note, however, that 
Innogenetics’ open policy is not legally mandated by patent law, which has little to 
say about patent licensing, but that it could be encouraged through competition law.  
They then call for further legislative innovation to promote such activity, suggesting 
exemptions and compulsory licensing, neither of which have had spectacular success 
to date. 
In “Dealing with Patent Fragmentation: The SARS Patent Pool as a Model”, Simon 
contributes another exemplar of how granted patents might better be exploited.  
Simon suggests that patent pools are an efficient means of dealing with patent right 
fragmentation and notes that the US Trade Commission has set guidelines for patent 
pools so that they might pass antitrust muster (p. 118-119).  He concedes that no gene 
                                                
4 For more on the importance of Opposition Proceedings and what the EPO might do to enhance their 
effectiveness, see S Harmon, “The Rules of Re-Engagement: The Use of Patent Proceedings To 
Influence the Regulation of Science (‘What The Salmon Does When Comes Back Downstream’)” 
(2006) 4 Intellectual Property Quarterly 378-403, and S Harmon, “From Engagement to Re-
Engagement: The Expression of Moral Values in Patenting Proceedings, Present and Future” (2006) 
31(5) European Law Review 642-666. 
5 Parenthetically, one might suggest that big pharma would be better served by changing its business 
model rather than further choking the innovation process with restrictive IP practices and milksop 
licensing arrangements. 
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patent pool has yet been established, but then cites the SARS situation as an ideal one 
to set the precedent (i.e.: the SARS corona virus was sequenced by multiple parties). 
In the final contributions – Zimmeren and Requena’s “Ex-Officio Licensing in the 
Medical Sector: The French Model”, Germann’s “The Swiss Approach to 
Compulsory Licensing for Diagnostic Products and Processes”, and De Brulle, De 
Corte and Petit’s “The Belgian Compulsory License for Public Health” (as translated 
and summarised by van Overwalle) – the authors review the compulsory licensing 
schemes in France, Switzerland and Belgium, and thereby permit a comparative 
assessment of these as a means of prompting movement in the unhealthy gridlock that 
characterises the relationship between patents and public health globally. 
Although both the social contract theoretical foundation of patenting is largely 
supported and the validity of diagnostic gene patents is largely accepted in Gene 
Patents and Public Health, the practical realisation of an appropriate public-private 
balance, and the exercise of rights and enforcement of limits and exceptions are 
questioned.  My own view, shared by Matthijs and Baldwin, is that stakeholder 
conduct in this field – as with many areas of activity which influence general human 
(or public) wellbeing – have swung in the direction of the interests of private (profit-
seeking) stakeholders, with a potential for disastrous long-term consequences.  One 
need only consider the conduct of certain actors to confirm this; of course, the Myriad 
(BRCA1 and BRCA2) example is widely referenced in the book (see Matthijs, 
Baldwin, Thomas, and Zimmeren and Requena), but others exist (eg: relating 
Canavan’s and Alzheimer’s diseases), greater reference to which would have better 
emphasised the widespread nature of the problems to which the book is directed. 
Nonetheless, as suggest in the book, much can be done to recalibrate that relationship 
and redress the imbalance short of scrapping the patent regime and its complex 
international framework (which is a well nigh impossible proposition).  In that 
respect, the judgment in Kirin-Amgen Inc. et al. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd. et 
al.6 is of some comfort.  In that case, Lord Hoffman held: 
[77] An invention is a practical product or process, not information 
about the natural world.  That seems to me to accord with the social 
contract between the state and the inventor which underlies patent 
law.  The state gives the inventor a monopoly in return for an 
immediate disclosure of all the information necessary to enable 
performance of the invention.  That disclosure is not only to enable 
other people to perform the invention after the patent has expired.  
If that were all, the inventor might as well be allowed to keep it 
secret during the life of the patent.  It is also to enable anyone to 
make immediate use of the information for any purpose which does 
not infringe the claims. 
In short, patent law should not be used to prevent other inventors from making use of 
basic information contained in the patent (eg: DNA sequence information) to create 
other inventions. 
Success at recalibrating the relationship would seem to depend on (1) recommitting 
ourselves to the rule of law as that law currently exists, and (2) legally extending the 
                                                
6 [2004] UKHL 46. 
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public responsibilities of patent-holders into the post-grant period.  With respect to the 
former, steps need to be taken to ensure that stakeholders are given the space to 
pursue socially valuable public health ends (eg: public health provisions and 
compulsory licensing provisions in instruments such as the TRIPS Agreement must 
be allowed to be given effect without fear of draconian legal and trade repercussions).  
With respect to the latter – extending the idea of the social contract into the post-grant 
period – one might note (as van Overwalle has) the work of the OECD and of Peter 
Drahos.  The OECD has issued non-binding Guidelines for the Licensing of Genetic 
Inventions which might serve as a model for both legislation and contractual 
arrangements in the genetic context.7  Drahos has conceptualised patents as 
temporary, duty-bearing privileges to exercise monopolies under fair and reasonable 
conditions.8  Such conceptual frameworks and preliminary actions are to be 
encouraged and supported.  Ultimately, all people (as patients) have a legitimate 
interest in seeking to make the patent system work properly.  In the genetic and public 
health context, “working properly” means in large measure working for the people 
and the greater good, and therefore in the least restrictive way. 
Gene Patents and Public Health offers the beginnings of creative ways to rectify the 
current controversies and quagmire.  The fact that the articles are now a couple years 
old does not, in most cases, detract from the relevance of the book, which should be 
of interest to anyone concerned with patents in the healthcare context and the desire to 
see them work for the benefit of humanity.  Having said that, given the intimate 
relationship between wellbeing, healthcare and ethics, and the growing dialogue 
concerning the interaction of patents and morality, I would have liked a greater 
contribution from the ethical perspective.  As noted by Baldwin (p. 48), the range of 
ethical issues raised by the topic is much broader than that actually addressed (eg: the 
ethics of patenting inventions contributed to by public funds, the ethics of making 
genetic diagnostic inventions available in developing countries, etc.).  Similarly, it 
might have been useful to consider in some greater detail the interaction between 
patent law and other legal and social systems (eg: research regulation and the 
operations of solidarity-based institutions) and how those interactions shape both the 
law and patenting practices. 
Ultimately, Gene Patents and Public Health is an accessible book from a worthy 
collection of experts which covers a lot of ground. 
 
Shawn H.E. Harmon 
University of Edinburgh 
 
DOI: 10.2966/scrip.050308.614 
 © Shawn H.E. Harmon 2008. This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Licence. Please click on the link to read the terms and conditions.  
                                                
7 See the OECD Guidelines for the Licensing of Genetic Inventions (2006), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/38/36198812.pdf [12 April 2008]. 
8  See P Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing Group, 
1996). 
